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The role of housing as a bequeathable asset
The so-called retirement-savings puzzle is a phenomenon by which, 
contrary to what the basic life-cycle model predicts, households do not 
run down their wealth significantly during retirement. In this survey 
paper Eduard Suari-Andreu, Rob Alessie and Viola Angelini (all RUG) 
briefly review the literature that attempts to solve the retirement savings 
puzzle. In addition, they  review more extensively the literature on 
housing equity during retirement. This paper contains important policy 
recommendations on this subject.
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the role of housing as 
a bequeathable asset
Abstract
The so-called retirement-savings puzzle is a phenomenon by 
which, contrary to what the basic life cycle model predicts, 
households do not draw down their wealth significantly during 
retirement. In this survey paper we briefly review the literature 
that attempts to solve the retirement-savings puzzle. In addition, 
we review more extensively the literature on housing equity 
during retirement. To establish a link between the two bodies 
of literature, we use as a framework the work of Nakajima and 
Telyukova (2011), who find that homeownership interacts with 
factors that explain the retirement-savings puzzle, notably 
with the bequest motive. Additionally, we complement the 
results by Nakajima and Telyukova (2011), relating them to 
the literature on altruistic bequests, strategic bequests, and 
housing as a commitment device, all of which provide insights 
on the connection between homeownership and bequests. 
We complement our review of the literature with descriptive 
evidence using Dutch data, which in general suggests that the 
insights stemming from the literature are relevant for a better 
understanding of the situation in the Netherlands.
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Policy recommendations
The ageing of the Dutch population is steadily putting financial 
pressure on the pension system as well as on the long-term 
care (LTC) insurance system. This already implies the need for 
changes in the direction of shifting the responsibility to finance 
these systems from the government towards the beneficiaries 
themselves. For example, the second pillar of the Dutch pension 
system is gradually shifting from a defined benefit scheme 
towards a defined contribution scheme. At the same time, as of 
January 1st, 2015, the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) 
has been replaced by the Long-Term Care Act (WLZ), a change 
that implies cutbacks in the public provision of LTC as well as 
the inclusion of wealth holdings in the means test for eligibility. 
This situation raises great concern as to whether individuals are 
financially prepared to bear the costs that these changes imply.
 In this context, policymakers as well as academics are looking 
into the potential of housing equity as a source of funds to finance 
both general consumption and LTC during retirement. In the 
Netherlands, housing represents a large share of the portfolio of 
retired households, and it is expected to be even more important 
in the future, since the generations currently in the pre-
retirement phase of the life cycle are more exposed to housing 
than those already in retirement. For Dutch retirees, housing is 
estimated to represent nowadays about 40% of their net wealth, 
while this number exceeds 50% for households with individuals 
who are between 50 and 65 years of age. However, as we suggest 
in this survey paper, households are generally reluctant to use 
housing equity as a source of funds for consumption during 
retirement. Taking all of these elements into account, we propose 
a number of measures and caveats to combine the use of private 
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savings, including housing equity and other forms of wealth, with 
public assistance to guarantee the financial well-being of Dutch 
retirees in the years to come.
Facilitate the use of housing equity when a precipitating event 
occurs
The literature on the evolution of house equity during retirement 
points out that households generally do not plan to use housing 
equity as a source of funds to finance general consumption 
during retirement. In fact, there seems to be a tendency to regard 
housing as an asset to be bequeathed. Nevertheless, there is 
recurrent evidence showing that when a precipitating event 
occurs, the chances that a retired homeowner liquidates housing 
increases substantially. The literature identifies several of such 
precipitating events that trigger downsizing of housing equity. 
The most important are nursing home entry, widowhood, divorce 
and nest leaving by children. This suggests that housing is viewed 
as an asset that, in the best case scenario, is left as a bequest. 
However, on the one hand it serves the purpose of preventive 
buffer against adverse shocks (e.g. nursing home entry), and, on 
the other hand, it appears to be sensitive to family transitions 
(e.g. widowhood, divorce and nest leaving by children). 
 When a precipitating event occurs, the government should 
facilitate the drawdown of housing wealth for households who 
consider it to be necessary, as this will clearly improve their 
welfare.1 For instance, when older homeowners experience 
nursing home entry, they may want to sell their house since, first, 
1 We acknowledge that the welfare gain depends on the relative importance of 
housing equity in the total household portfolio. The literature recognizes that 
households that are house-rich and cash-poor are the most benefit the most 
from measures directed towards facilitating housing equity release. Any of 
these potential measures should take this into account.
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it is not needed any more for housing purposes and, second, it 
can help finance their stay in the nursing home. Similarly, an 
older household that experiences a widowhood event might 
contemplate selling to move into a smaller accommodation 
(owned or rented), which can be coupled with the transfer of 
part of the bequest to the heirs. In situations such as these, the 
government can consider easing the transaction costs that such 
transitions imply. This might be done mainly in two ways: first, by 
exceptionally reducing for retirees the transaction tax households 
have to pay upon buying a house; and, second, by directly aiding 
retirees in the process of selling and/or searching for a new house 
or nursing home.
 When evaluating the cost effectiveness of the two above 
mentioned alternative options, i.e. either reducing taxes or 
providing direct assistance, it should be considered that tax 
incentives also involve a cost since they imply a reduction in 
government revenues. Furthermore, manipulating tax rates 
typically implies unforeseen distorting effects. Therefore, tax 
cuts to incentivize certain types of behavior should always be 
implemented carefully, considering the cost in terms of lost 
revenues and the possible unwanted secondary effects that 
could imply misallocation of resources. This applies for the above 
mentioned measure referring to a reduction in the housing 
transaction tax, as well as for all the measures in this policy 
recommendations section that seek to foster certain behavior by 
means of tax incentives.
Stimulate the demand for releasing wealth locked in housing 
equity
Besides facilitating the drawdown of housing equity for house-
holds who wish to do so as a consequence of a precipitating event 
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(which, as the literature points out, represent a small minority 
of households), government policy can also consider stimulating 
the demand for release of housing equity among households 
who have not yet considered it or who are not aware of this 
possibility. Stimulating this demand can be oriented towards the 
use of housing to finance general consumption, as well as towards 
increasing its use as insurance against adverse shocks and as a 
way to accommodate family transitions. This can be done through 
two main channels: the first involves facilitating housing equity 
liquidation through the development of new products, while the 
second implies informing the public at large about the possibility 
of using housing equity.
 The first channel may consist of a range of different measures 
that can go from making existing ways to release housing 
equity more attractive, to the development of new housing 
equity release products. For example, it may consist of lowering 
housing transaction costs not only for those who experience 
a precipitating event, but as well through introducing basic 
measures that would apply to all retired households. In addition, 
special tax advantages can be considered as a way to stimulate 
the use of second mortgages and mortgage refinancing among 
retired homeowners who are in need of cash.2 Regarding the 
development of new products, the introduction of reverse 
mortgages can be considered. The latter have never rooted so 
far in the Netherlands. Therefore, it might be helpful to relate 
them to LTC expenditures since, on the one hand due to the 
need of liquidity required to afford LTC, and on the other hand 
2 The promotion of mortgage debt should be coupled with the enforcement of 
solid guarantees of repayment. The government and the banks should ensure 
that an increase in this type of debt, meant for older homeowners who want 
to liquidate housing equity, does not imply an increase in systemic risk due to 
excessive debt.
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due to the reduced life expectancy of those in need of care it 
can be a realistic way to initiate a market for reverse mortgages. 
Furthermore, it can be of help to consider reverse mortgages 
that fully cover against longevity risk, i.e. that provide a stream 
of payments for as long as the household lives, since the reverse 
mortgages that have been tested so far in the Netherlands did not 
provide such a feature.
 The second channel may consist of measures ranging from 
promoting financial literacy, with a stress on the uses of housing 
equity, to informing the public in detail about the different 
instruments that can be used to liquidate housing equity. For 
instance, the use of second mortgages and mortgage refinancing 
as a way to tap housing equity is an option that is available in the 
Netherlands and that can easily be publicized by the government 
and the banks. As to reverse mortgages, the literature shows that 
the Dutch public at large is mostly ignorant about what these 
are and what can they can be used for. More precisely, a recent 
survey reveals that only one out of every ten homeowners in 
the Netherlands knows what a reverse mortgage is. Therefore, a 
campaign to provide basic information can be useful to generate 
interest, stimulate demand, and, in that way, help the market get 
started.
Stress the use of using reverse mortgages as a way to time 
bequests
The literature on housing equity after retirement and the 
documented descriptive evidence for the Netherlands suggest 
that the role of housing as a bequeathable asset is relevant to 
under- stand the saving patterns of Dutch retirees. One important 
implication of a strong bequest motive related to housing is that 
it reduces the market niche for reverse mortgages, since the latter 
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imply that the house becomes property of the bank once the 
household decides to move or dies. In such a context, it seems 
difficult to kick start a market for reverse mortgages that could 
benefit a non-negligible share of retired homeowners who do not 
intend to bequeath part or all of their assets.
 A plausible solution to this problem is to market reverse 
mortgages as an instrument that, besides helping provide 
liquidity for general consumption and LTC expenses, can provide 
a way to optimally transfer the bequest to the heirs. Given the 
recent increases in life expectancy, individuals nowadays are likely 
to receive bequests at an increasingly advanced age, which might 
not be the preferred option. For example, an optimal period 
in life to receive a bequest would typically be around the ages 
between 30 and 40, when family building and house purchase 
are more likely to take place nowadays. However, due to the rise 
in longevity, people are increasingly likely to receive a bequest 
around the ages between 50 and 60, when the need for financial 
help is likely to be smaller.
 A reverse mortgage can potentially represent a solution to this 
problem, since it would allow parents to transfer the bequest to 
the heirs at any time that they wish, without having to move out 
of their main residence. As an alternative to a lump sum transfer 
at a particular point in time, a reverse mortgage would instead 
allow for the liquidation of the housing asset to translate into a 
stream of periodic inter-vivos transfers over time. In summary, 
reverse mortgages can provide more flexibility in the timing of 
bequests, which would result in benefits for both the parents 
and the heirs. Taking this aspect into account may help kick 
start the market for reverse mortgages, which would ultimately 
be beneficial for both households with and without a bequest 
motive.
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Couple tax incentives to inter-vivos transfers with an income 
test for LTC eligibility
In line with the recommendation to market reverse mortgages 
as a way to time bequests, it is also worth fostering inter-vivos 
transfers by favoring their tax treatment relative to bequests. At 
the moment, inter-vivos transfers are treated for tax purposes 
in exactly the same way as bequests, i.e. a progressive tax 
levied on the beneficiary’s share of the transfer that depends 
on the relationship between the giver and the recipient, with 
spouses and children, siblings, and others being subject to tax 
rates ranging from lower to higher respectively. Considering the 
relevance of the bequest motive, fostering inter-vivos transfers 
by lowering taxation relative to bequests can help optimize the 
timing of bequests for the reasons already mentioned in the 
previous policy recommendation.
 The problem with such a measure is that it can have negative 
side effects due to the recently introduced wealth test for the 
determination of eligibility to publicly provided LTC. Since the 
1990s, eligibility to such provisions was essentially needs-based 
coupled with co-payments dependent on income. With the 
new regime, the recipient’s wealth is also considered when 
determining the amount of the co-payment. Therefore, decreasing 
taxes on inter-vivos transfers can have an unwanted side effect, in 
the sense that it may create an incentive for retired households to 
draw down their wealth by passing it on to their children and, in 
that way, become eligible for LTC.3 Taking this caveat into account, 
it would be prudent to only consider tax advantages for inter-
vivos transfers if coupled with an income test and not a wealth 
3 The wealth test does not include the main residence. Therefore, introduction of 
reverse mortgages as a way to optimize the timing of bequests would not imply 
the negative side effect mentioned here.
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test. In the case of retired households, the use of an income 
test has an additional benefit, namely that pension income is a 
good proxy for permanent income: compared to wealth holdings 
it is a better indicator of whether a person has enough lifetime 
resources to afford LTC expenses during retirement or not.
 An alternative way to tackle the negative side effects of favoring 
inter-vivos transfers can be the introduction of a review period, as 
already introduced in the US in relation to Medicaid provisions. It 
consists of extending the wealth test to a specific number of years 
(five in the US) preceding the moment when LTC is requested. If a 
household transferred wealth to its offspring during such period, 
this would imply a penalty when calculating the co-payment 
required for LTC provision. This measure would prevent households 
from drawing down their wealth by transferring it to their children 
for the purpose of becoming eligible for public coverage of LTC. 
Furthermore, it would make the system more equitable since it 
would treat people with the similar lifetime income, but with 
different preferences when it comes to saving (either for a bequest 
or for precautionary reasons), in the same way.
Promote the intergenerational exchange of bequests for 
informal LTC provision
An additional way to counteract the decline in generosity of the 
pension and the LTC insurance systems is to foster the provision of 
informal care within families for those who can afford it. In the 
Netherlands, a person who takes care of a family member, a friend 
or a neighbor can apply to be considered as a care giver, in Dutch 
mantelzorger. If the status is granted, and the care giver is a first 
degree relative of the care receiver, i.e. offspring, parent or sibling, 
then they can become partners for the inheritance tax. This 
partnership means that the care giver will enjoy lower inheritance 
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taxes on the bequest that he/she will receive from the dependent 
family member when the latter dies.
 The literature on bequests and the documented evidence for 
the Netherlands indicate the existence of a strategic bequest 
motive. In other words, there are retirees who use the bequest 
as a way to incentivize provision of services by the heirs. Such 
retirees have an incentive to use the house as a bequest, since it 
is a visible as well as illiquid asset that can easily be used to signal 
that a bequest will come. The existence of such a bequest motive 
indicates that there are grounds to extend the benefits for care 
givers to promote informal care to a larger extent, which can help 
counteract the recent cutbacks in the public provision of LTC.
 Nowadays, the partnership for the inheritance tax is only 
granted if the care giver and the dependent person live in 
the same house. The government might consider relaxing this 
condition, by either allowing family members who do not live in 
the same house to apply for the partnership and/or by giving extra 
benefits to informal care givers, thus fostering the use of bequests 
(in the form of housing equity and/or other wealth components) 
as an incentive for the recipients to provide informal LTC. The 
final outcome of this measure would be similar to promoting 
the use of housing equity to finance LTC, with the difference 
that it would not imply liquidating the house, but leaving it as 
a bequest in exchange for the provision of informal care. As a 
word of caution, any measure in this direction should take into 
account that providing informal care may considerably disrupt 
the income earning ability of the provider. Therefore, the cost in 
terms of lost earnings should be considered when determining the 
compensation to the care giver.
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Earmark inheritance tax revenues for LTC-related expenses
Due to the presence of a bequest motive related to housing 
and considering the attachment that retirees have to their own 
house, it may well be that relying on the withdrawal of housing 
equity through different means is not enough to counterbalance 
the changes in the pension system and the public LTC insurance 
system. In such a scenario it may be advisable to introduce a 
clearly progressive tax on the housing equity portion of bequests. 
The revenues generated can then be earmarked for expenses 
related to the LTC of retired individuals. This would complement 
the financing sources of the LTC public insurance system, which 
currently consist of mandatory insurance premiums and a small 
portion of funds from the co-payment scheme.
 Such a measure can have several benefits. First, it can represent 
a source of stable funds to finance part of the coverage of long 
term care that the Dutch government still provides under the 
new regime. Second, it can help give to an important share of 
the aggregate private wealth stocked in the form of housing 
an adequate use in the present context of declining generosity 
of pension and public LTC systems. In fact, this measure would 
ultimately be similar to nudging households into liquidating their 
housing equity to finance LTC expenses. Third, this measure would 
serve to uphold the redistributive feature of the pension system, 
which would be lost if the pension and public LTC systems were to 
be completely substituted by a system that relies solely on private 
savings. The main problem of such a measure is that individuals 
may try to bypass it by leaving bequests in more liquid forms 
of wealth. However, this would imply an incentive to liquidate 
housing during retirement, which in itself is not necessarily a 
problem since it would allow assigning every euro of liquidated 
housing wealth to its most preferred use.
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1. Introduction 
The stripped version of the life cycle model (without uncertainty 
and without the bequest motive) predicts that households 
accumulate wealth throughout working life and decumulate 
it during retirement to support their consumption (Ando and 
Modigliani, 1963). However, a large body of evidence points to the 
fact that older adults usually decumulate wealth at a slower pace 
than predicted by the basic life cycle model (Poterba et al., 2011). 
This phenomenon is known as the retirement-savings puzzle 
(RSP). In the present context of economic crisis and population 
ageing, the sustainability of public pension systems is under 
pressure. Thereby, it is relevant to study the underlying motives 
behind the RSP, since it is a key element for understanding 
whether people are financially prepared to face a decrease in the 
generosity of pension systems. In this survey paper, we review the 
literature on the RSP, focusing specially on the role of housing as a 
bequeathable asset, which we argue to be an important element 
towards understanding the RSP.
 This survey paper starts out by briefly reviewing the general 
literature on the RSP. This literature can be classified according to 
the explanations given to solve the puzzle. We distinguish three 
main explanations: lifetime uncertainty, the bequest motive, and 
uncertainty regarding medical expenditures. Even though the 
evidence on the motives we discuss is rather mixed, depending 
on the context and after controlling for the relevant factors, they 
all appear relevant enough to be considered meaningful additions 
to the basic life cycle model. Parallel to the RSP literature, there is 
a body of literature that studies the evolution of housing equity 
during retirement (HER). Since housing equity is usually a very 
significant component of household portfolios, we pay special 
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attention to this literature and thus review it in greater depth. 
The general conclusion of the HER literature is that homeowners 
are generally reluctant to draw down their housing equity during 
retirement. However, most studies conducted so far are rather 
descriptive, and the link with the RSP literature is generally 
missing. Therefore, this paper aims at emphasizing the connection 
between these two bodies of literature.
 The RSP literature and HER literature come together in the 
recent work by Nakajima and Telyukova (2011), who introduce a 
model of retirement savings with housing. The model constitutes 
an extension to the previous work by De Nardi et al. (2010), who 
consider a model for single retirees which includes lifetime 
uncertainty, bequests and uncertain medical expenditures. The 
addition by Nakajima and Telyukova (NT) consists of extending 
the model to couples and analyzed the housing asset separate 
from other assets in the portfolio, which turns out to have 
crucial consequences for the understanding of the RSP. The main 
conclusion stemming from their work is that homeownership 
interacts with factors that explain the RSP, notably with 
the bequest motive. We review the NT model in depth and 
complement it with additional literature that contributes towards 
understanding of the link between homeownership, bequests, 
and the RSP. The extensions that we consider are altruistic 
bequests, strategic bequests, and housing as a commitment 
device.
 We complement our review of the literature with descriptive 
evidence for the Netherlands. To that end, we rely on data from 
the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS), an internet-
based panel survey run by CentERdata, an institute based at 
Tilburg University that collects data on economic, financial 
and psychological aspects of household behavior. It collects 
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data for around two thousand Dutch households every year 
between 1993 and 2014. We mostly use the last ten waves, which 
provide a recent and large enough sample for our purposes.4 
The evidence that we present generally supports the idea that, 
in the Netherlands, the role of housing as a bequeathable asset 
is potentially an important factor to understand the underlying 
causes of the RSP. Since we rely on correlative evidence, we cannot 
entirely establish whether the causality runs from the bequest 
motive to homeownership or vice versa. Nevertheless, we can say 
that the housing asset is an element that definitely needs to be 
considered when studying bequests.
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the RSP 
literature, which we classify according to the explanation given for 
the puzzle. Section 3 reviews the HER literature, which we classify 
according to the origin of the data, i.e. US studies, international 
studies, and Dutch studies. Section 4 summarizes the NT model. 
Section 5 explores the relationship between homeownership 
and bequests by using the DHS data. Section 6 complements the 
NT model with a review of the literature on alternative bequest 
motives, i.e. altruistic bequests and strategic bequests. Section 7 
complements the NT model by reviewing the literature on housing 
as a commitment device. Section 8 closes the paper with a short 
conclusion.
4 Households without a computer and/or access to the Internet were provided 
with a basic computer and Iinternet connection to complete the survey. 
Attrition is dealt with by refreshing the sample every six months with new 
households to keep the panel representative of the Dutch population. High 
income households are slightly overrepresented. Therefore, for all results 
presented in this paper, we employ sample weights provided by CentERdata, 
which take into account unequal selection probabilities.
the role of housing as a bequeathable asset 21
2. The retirement-savings puzzle
The literature on the retirement-savings puzzle (RSP) shows 
that households generally do not reduce their wealth during 
retirement in the way the basic life cycle model suggests. 
Additionally, it attempts to determine the reasons behind this 
phenomenon. Poterba et al. (2011) and Van Ooijen et al. (2015) 
provide thorough reviews of this literature. In this paper we 
confine ourselves to a brief summary, which we use as a stepping 
stone for the rest of the paper.
 Most of the literature on the RSP can be classified into three 
branches according to the explanation given as a key to solve the 
puzzle. First, there is a branch of the literature, initiated by Yaari 
(1965), which investigates the role of lifetime uncertainty as an 
explanation for the RSP. Recent contributions to this literature 
are De Nardi et al. (2009), Cocco and Gomes (2012) and Post and 
Hanewald (2013). A life cycle model without lifetime uncertainty 
implies that households are perfectly aware of their time of death. 
Therefore, they can plan with full accuracy to gradually draw down 
their wealth so that it is fully depleted by the time they die. With 
lifetime uncertainty in the model, households do not have full 
certainty about their time of death, and thus they generate an 
expectation about it. If households die earlier than expected, 
their wealth will not be totally depleted, leading to involuntary 
bequests. On the other hand, the risk of outliving their net worth 
induces households to deplete their wealth more slowly compared 
to the case without lifetime uncertainty.
 Second, there is a branch of the literature, initiated by Becker 
(1974), Bernheim et al. (1985) and Hurd (1989), which explores 
the role of voluntary bequests as an explanation for the RSP. 
More recent contributions include Laitner (2002), Kopczuk and 
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Lupton (2007), and De Nardi and Yang (2014). In the basic life cycle 
model, households aim at dying with zero wealth. Introducing a 
bequest motive implies that they derive utility from dying with 
positive net worth, which flattens the wealth trajectory during 
retirement. Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) classify the literature 
according to three types of bequest motive: the egoistic motive 
(Hurd, 1989; De Nardi and Yang, 2014), in which households leave 
a bequest simply to increase their own utility; the altruistic motive 
(Becker, 1974; Laitner, 2002), in which the utility of the recipient 
plays a role in determining the bequest; and the strategic motive 
(Bernheim et al., 1985; Perozek, 1998), in which, besides being 
altruistic, older adults use the bequest to strategically influence 
the quantity of services provided to them by the recipients. In 
addition to intentional bequests, there is a related branch of the 
literature that focuses on inter-vivos transfers (e.g. Cox, 1987; 
Norton and Van Houtven, 2006; Hochguertel and Ohlsson, 2009; 
and Alessie et al., 2010), which are expected to affect the saving 
behavior of older adults in a way similar to the bequest motive.
Third, there is a more recent branch of the literature (e.g. 
Palumbo, 1999; Coile and Milligan, 2009; De Nardi et al., 2010; and 
Dobrescu, 2015) that considers the role of uncertain out-of- pocket 
medical expenditures (OPME), i.e. non-insured medical expenses, 
as an explanation for the RSP. The basic life cycle model does not 
include health as a determinant of saving and consumption. The 
introduction of the health status allows for considering the role of 
uncertainty regarding OPME. The basic idea is that, depending on 
age, health status, and a stochastic term, households face a risk 
of incurring medical expenditures. If they are unable to obtain 
full insurance against this risk, they will engage in precautionary 
saving, thus retaining a buffer stock of savings that will flatten the 
wealth trajectory during retirement.
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 Even though the empirical evidence on the different 
explanations discussed in this section is rather mixed, depending 
on the context and after controlling for the relevant factors, they 
all appear relevant enough to be considered meaningful additions 
to the basic life cycle model. However, note that the different 
explanations are not necessarily incompatible. It may well be that 
households rank them according to their preferences. In such 
case, the unfolding of exogenous events will crucially determine 
which purpose is eventually assigned to the savings of a retired 
household.
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3. Home equity in retirement
Parallel to the literature on the retirement savings puzzle (RSP), 
there is a stream of literature that studies the evolution of 
housing equity during retirement (HER). Housing is an asset that 
deserves special attention due to its dual role as consumption and 
investment good, and due to its associated transaction
costs, which make adjustments in housing rather infrequent. 
Furthermore, it is very often the most important asset in a 
household portfolio. This is the case in the Netherlands, where 
during the past several decades homeownership has increased 
substantially, which appears to remain high as households 
enter retirement.5 Table 1 shows that, according to DHS data, 
among three cohorts of Dutch households above 60 years of age, 
homeownership and the ratio of housing equity to total net worth 
are rather high and have not significantly changed during the 
last five years of the survey, i.e. from 2010 to 2014. Furthermore, 
Table 1 suggests that there are relevant cohort effects indicating 
that younger generations gradually rely more on housing in their 
portfolios.
 In general, the HER literature aims at answering the question 
of whether retirees regard housing equity as a source of funds 
for general consumption. According to Venti and Wise (2004), 
answering this question is important for two reasons. First, it 
can help assess the potential demand for releasing the wealth 
locked in illiquid housing, which has implications for the 
development of financial products such as reverse mortgages. 
Second, it contributes to understanding the adequacy of saving 
5 According to the OECD, the Netherlands experienced during the 1990s and early 
2000s the largest increase in homeownership among OECD countries (Andrews 
and Caldera-Sanchez, 2011). According to DHS, the homeownership rate in the 
Netherlands stood at 57.48% in 2014.
the role of housing as a bequeathable asset 25
for retirement. If financial wealth and housing wealth are used 
interchangeably to finance consumption, then the latter might 
as well be given the same treatment as financial wealth when 
evaluating whether households save enough for retirement.
3.1 US studies
One of the first to tackle the question of whether retirees use 
housing equity to fund general consumption were Venti and Wise 
(1990). Using the Retirement History Survey (RHS), they find that 
on average older adults who move do not downsize their housing 
equity. They conclude that older adults are in general not willing 
to use housing equity for consumption. On the contrary, Sheiner 
and Weil (1992) find, using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), that average levels of homeownership among older adults 
decline significantly with age and conclude that housing wealth 
is used for consumption. However, even though the results are 
statistically significant, their economic significance is questionable 
since the observed decline in homeownership is rather limited. 
Hurd (2002) confirms, using a panel data set derived from the 
Table 1. Homeownership and housing wealth among older adults
Homeownership rate Housing equity over net worth
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3
2010 62.71% 52.50% 50.22% 43.48% 38.12% 36.70%
2011 60.12% 49.89% 49.60% 41.81% 37.74% 36.02%
2012 61.56% 53.29% 53.02% 40.50% 36.39% 35.22%
2013 60.39% 53.53% 51.94% 40.65% 37.96% 35.81%
2014 58.60% 56.57% 47.87% 39.09% 36.85% 34.07%
Source: DHS. Cohorts 1, 2 and 3 include households with household heads aged 60 
to 64, 65 to 69 and 70 to 74 in 2010. The second panel provides the average share 
of housing equity (i.e. house value minus remaining mortgage debt) over total net 
worth (assets minus liabilities) of households.
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Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD), a 
modest decline in housing wealth and homeownership rates 
among older adults. In addition, he points out that households 
experiencing a health shock or a widowhood event display larger 
declines in housing equity and are more likely to terminate 
homeownership.
 Following on the work by Hurd (2002), Venti and Wise (2004) 
perform a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of housing 
equity during retirement, paying special attention to the effect 
of precipitating events, i.e. widowhood and nursing home entry. 
They combine the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) with the 
AHEAD survey and consider two ways by which homeowners can 
change their housing equity: by discontinuing homeownership 
or by selling and moving to a newly purchased residence. By 
means of cohort specific analysis, they find that households who 
experience a widowhood event or nursing home entry display 
considerable declines in homeownership and in housing equity, 
while for households who do not experience any of these events 
housing equity remains almost intact throughout retirement. 
Overall, they find that older adults are rather unlikely to move or 
to terminate homeownership.6 They conclude that housing equity 
is generally not used for consumption. This has two implications: 
first, the demand for reverse mortgages is low, and, second, 
housing wealth should not be counted when assessing retirement 
savings, since it is not interchangeable with financial wealth. 
Instead, it might be appropriate to think of housing equity as a 
consumption good that, at the same time, provides a preventive 
buffer for adverse shocks.
6 Venti and Wise (2004) do find a very slight decrease in housing equity among 
the oldest households (75+) that do not experience any precipitating event. 
However, they attribute this to depreciation of the housing asset, which can 
actually be considered to be a form of housing equity withdrawal.
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 In contrast to Venti and Wise (2004), Sinai and Souleles 
(2007) study the evolution of housing equity in retirement but 
do not consider homeowners who move. Instead, they look at 
homeowners who stay in the same residence, and study how 
they react to the remarkable increase in house prices experienced 
in the US market between 1983 and 2004. Using the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF), which provides repeated cross sections 
over time, they report that households, especially the youngest 
among older adults, have offset the rise in housing equity by 
increasing their housing debt through housing equity loans. 
However, they point out that the offset effect is rather small and 
that it could be larger if there were fewer restrictions to borrow 
against housing wealth. Contrary to Venti and Wise (2004), Sinai 
and Souleles conclude that households are potentially willing 
to liquidate housing wealth to finance consumption. Therefore, 
only the percentage of housing wealth that cannot be borrowed 
against should be considered as not interchangeable with 
financial wealth.
3.2 International studies
Moving away from strictly US-based studies, Banks et al. (2012) 
compare downsizing among retirees in Great Britain and in the 
US. Their work is similar to Venti and Wise (2004) in the sense 
that they focus on households who move to a new location. The 
analysis is based on data from PSID for the US and from the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for Great Britain. They find that, 
upon moving, British older adults downsize more than Americans. 
However, the percentage of older households who actually move 
is much higher in the US. As a consequence, considering the entire 
population above retirement age, more downsizing takes place in 
the US compared to Great Britain, even though in both countries 
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the vast majority of older households do not actually move. These 
comparative results hold when controlling for marital status, 
family size, and employment transitions. Additionally, Banks 
et al. focus on studying the factors that explain the difference 
in mobility. They conclude that it is a mix of geographical 
factors (in the US there is more climate diversity and variation 
in environmental amenities) and institutional factors (in Great 
Britain there are more transaction costs due to taxation of home 
sales) that explains the higher percentage of moving households 
in the US. These results suggest that, in Europe in general, moving 
house during retirement may be less popular than in the US due 
to higher institutional restrictions and less variation in tax regimes 
and geographical amenities within countries.
 Among the very few fully international studies, Chiuri and 
Jappelli (2010) use data on15 OECD countries, while Angelini et 
al. (2014), in the only Europe-wide study so far, use data on 
13 European countries. The former employ data from different 
country-specific surveys, which allow them to construct a data 
set of repeated cross-sections over time. They look at the cross-
sectional relationship between homeownership and age, and 
find that homeownership rates decline considerably after age 60. 
However, after controlling for cohort effects, the decline becomes 
much more moderate, not starting until after age 75. In addition, 
they find that cross-country variation in terms of institutions, 
such as tax regimes and mortgage market regulations, have an 
impact on the degree to which housing wealth is withdrawn 
during retirement. On the other hand, Angelini et al. (2014) use 
life history data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
in Europe (SHARE) and, similar to Venti and Wise (2004) and Banks 
et al. (2012), study the behavior of homeowners and renters who 
move. Even though they assert that moves are rare all over Europe, 
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they are likely to happen when there is a precipitating event, i.e. 
divorce, widowhood and nest-leaving by children. In addition, 
they also find after controlling for country characteristics and 
family transitions, that economic reasons may play a role, since 
retirees who are cash-poor and house-rich are the most likely to 
downsize their housing asset.
3.3 Dutch studies
Narrowing the focus to the Dutch case, Van der Schors et al. (2007) 
employ data from the Dutch Social Economic Panel (SEP) for the 
period 1990-2002 and find a strong negative cross-sectional 
relation between age and homeownership among Dutch 
households. However, a detailed analysis indicates that this age 
gradient is mostly due to cohort effects. They find that higher 
lifetime income due to long-term productivity growth is the main 
factor that explains generational effects in homeownership among 
older adults. In addition, they find that changes in the supply 
of housing and relaxation of the requirements for obtaining 
a mortgage loan also play a role in explaining why younger 
generations of older adults display higher homeownership 
rates. This evidence has recently been confirmed by Van Ooijen 
et al. (2015). They describe the saving behavior and the portfolio 
choice of Dutch retirees by using high-quality administrative 
data for the 2005-2010 period. Like Van der Schors et al. (2007), 
they find strong differences between cohorts. However, both 
homeownership rates and the amount of housing equity held by 
older households do not appear to decline significantly with age.
 In a different study, De Graaf and Rouwendal (2012) investigate 
whether older Dutch house- holds liquidate housing wealth by 
increasing their mortgage debt or taking a second mortgage. 
Using data from the WoningOnderzoek Nederland (WoON) survey 
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for the 1985-2009 period, they find that older adults, even 
though they may not have completely repaid their mortgage, do 
not increase their mortgage debt, not even when house prices 
increase at considerably high rates. They consequently conclude 
that the vast majority of older homeowners do not use mortgage 
debt to decumulate housing equity. More recently, Dillingh et al. 
(2015), investigate a similar issue by conducting a survey on the 
psychological and economic aspects of reverse mortgage attitudes 
of homeowners in the Netherlands. They explain to respondents 
what a reverse mortgage is and then ask to what extent they 
might be interested in such a product.7 Even though they are 
optimistic about the potential demand for reverse mortgages, only 
6% of respondents show clear interest, while 21% show moderate 
interest. However, given the evidence in De Graaf and Rouwendal 
(2012) about second mortgages, it is doubtful that many of these 
respondents would actually purchase a reverse mortgage in 
practice.
 The findings by Van der Schors et al. (2007) and Van Ooijen et 
al. (2015) agree with the evidence in Table 1, which shows clear 
cohort effects. Table 2 takes the analysis a step further by showing 
that, according to DHS data, most Dutch older households do not 
move. Only about 7% of the households above 60 years of age 
interviewed between 2005 and 2014 reported to have moved.8 
Among those who move, less than half (about 37%) do it to 
7 A striking fact about this survey is that only 9% of respondents declare to know 
what a reverse mortgage is.
8 Note that the panel we are using is not balanced and thus many households 
are not interviewed over the full ten-year period. In fact, only 16.74% of all 
households interviewed between 2004 and 2014 are followed throughout the 
whole period. This means that the time frame in which we know whether a 
household moved or not is heterogeneous. The percentage of respondents who 
report to have moved could differ if all households were observed over the full 
ten-year period.
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downsize their housing asset either through own-to-rent or 
own-to-own transitions. In addition, Table 3 shows that Dutch 
households generally do not plan to use their housing equity, 
which could be done by either moving, taking out an extra 
mortgage, or increasing the amount of the present mortgage. The 
results in Table 3 support the findings by De Graaf and Rouwendal 
(2012) and do not leave much room for optimism regarding the 
potential demand for reverse mortgages in the Netherlands. The 
Table 2. Housing moves among older adults (2005-2014)
Total older households interviewed 1,441







Source: DHS. Older households are defined as households with a household head 
who is 60 or older. The survey does not capture nursing home entries. This table 
contains information on all of the 60+ households interviewed between 2005 and 
2014. The panel is not balanced, hence the time frame in which we know whether 
an interviewed household moved or not is heterogeneous.













Full sample 2.32% 4.03% 34.39% 56.56% 2.70% 9,469
Older households 2.15% 4.25% 31.93% 59.68% 1.99% 3,956
Source: DHS. Households were asked: “Are you planning on using the surplus 
value of your property in the next two years (by taking out an extra mortgage, by 
increasing your mortgage amount, or by moving)?”.Older households are defined 
as households with a household head aged 60 or older.
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evidence in Tables 1 to 3 is in line with the findings by Suari-
Andreu (2015), who, using the same DHS dataset employed in 
the present study, reports that Dutch households of all ages do 
not compensate house price declines by increasing their savings. 
This type of behavior suggests that Dutch households do not plan 
to tap their housing equity during retirement to finance regular 
consumption.
 Summarizing, even though the evidence provided by the HER 
literature surveyed in this entire section appears to be somewhat 
mixed, a general conclusion can be drawn that older households 
do not usually withdraw housing equity during retirement. 
However, the HER literature is mostly descriptive, and the link with 
the RSP literature is rather limited. Therefore, the next step is to 
ask why housing equity is not withdrawn. Is it because of lifetime 
uncertainty? Is it because housing wealth is used as precautionary 
savings? Or is it because housing is regarded as an asset to 
be bequeathed? While these questions are crucial for policy-
setting and for the understanding of the RSP, the HER literature 
summarized in this section is generally descriptive and does not 
tackle them directly. In the next section we therefore introduce a 
theoretical framework that aims at tackling these questions. By 
doing so, it connects the HER literature with the literature on the 
RSP discussed in Section 2.
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4. A model of retirement savings with housing
The two streams of literature outlined in Sections 2 and 3 come 
together in the work by Nakajima and Telyukova (2011), who 
argue that the retirement-savings puzzle (RSP) cannot be solved 
without emphasizing the role of the housing asset. Using HRS 
data, Nakajima and Telyukova (NT) find that the post-retirement 
evolution of assets shows a very different picture for homeowners 
compared to renters: while the former do not draw down their 
wealth during retirement, the latter do, which suggests that 
homeownership interacts with factors that explain the RSP. These 
insights are of clear potential importance for explaining the RSP 
in the Netherlands, where, as shown by Tables 1, 2 and 3, it is very 
likely to be driven by the lack of housing equity withdrawal during 
retirement.
 NT are the first to study housing equity in retirement in the 
context of a structural life cycle model, similar to the ones 
employed in the RSP literature. The model constitutes an 
extension to the previous work by De Nardi et al. (2010), who 
consider a model for single retirees which includes lifetime 
uncertainty, bequests, and uncertain medical expenditures. 
The addition by NT consists of extending the model to couples 
and analyzing the housing asset separately from the rest of the 
portfolio. This turns out to have crucial consequences for our 
understanding of the RSP. In this section we explain the NT model 
in detail and the results obtained when estimating its parameters 
using HRS data. Furthermore, we propose several extensions to 
their framework: altruistic bequests, strategic bequests, and 
housing as a commitment device.
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4.1 Utility function
In the NT model, every household is born as a retiree at age i = 1 
and potentially lives up to age I . In every period, the household 
chooses consumption, saving and housing such as to maximize 
remaining lifetime utility, which is time-additive. The within-

















where the first term captures the utility derived from consumption 
and housing, while the second term captures the utility derived 
from leaving posthumous wealth as a bequest. In the first 
element, c is (non-housing) consumption, h is consumption of 
housing services, s is the number of adults in the household, 
the subscript o is the tenure status, with o = 1 indicating owner 
and o = 0 indicating renter, µs is the effective household size, 
ωo captures the extra utility from owning a house,9 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 
is a parameter capturing the relative weight of non-housing 
consumption versus housing services, and σ ≥ 0 is the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion. In the second element in (1), b is 
posthumous wealth, γ ≥ 0 captures the strength of the bequest
motive, and ζ ≥ 0 is a parameter determining the extent to which 
bequests are luxury goods.
 Regarding the first element in (1), there are two relevant 
features worth mentioning. The first is that utility is non-
separable in consumption and housing, which allows for the 
marginal utility of consumption to be positively dependent 
9 NT set ω0 = 1, while ω1 > 1.
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on housing, i.e. ∂u(·)/∂c = f (h, c) and ∂f (h, c)/∂h > 0. The 
intuition is that the quantity of housing services consumed, 
which is assumed to increase linearly with the size of the house, 
increases the marginal utility derived from an additional unit 
of consumption. The second relevant feature refers to the way 
couples are modelled. NT follow the unitary assumption, implying 
that both members of a couple have the same utility function and 
that consumption is split equally between the two. However, each 
member enjoys more than half of the consumption flow because 
of the returns to scale within couples, captured by the household 
size multiplier, given by s/µ1−σ.10
 As indicated by the second element in (1), in addition to the 
utility derived from consumption and housing, a household 
gains utility from leaving a bequest once all of its members have 
died. A bequest consists of all of the wealth that is left behind 
after death; which includes the house if the household dies as a 
homeowner. Similar to Hurd (1989), Kopczuk and Lupton (2007), 
and De Nardi et al. (2010), NT assume that bequests follow an 
egoistic motive, since the utility derived from leaving a bequest 
does not depend on the utility of the recipient. Furthermore, there 
is no room for bequests to be used strategically as compensation 
for services provided by the recipients.
4.2 Housing
For a homeowner, the housing decision consists of two options: 
staying in the present residence or becoming a renter. For a renter 
the only housing choice is the size of the rental property. Own-to-
own and rent-to-own moves are assumed away by NT due to their 
10 NT assume that µ1 = 1 and µ2 ∈ {1, 2}, which implies that the household size 
multiplier for a single is 1/µ1
1−σ= 1; while for a couple it is 2/µ2
1−σ, which is 
equal to 2 if µ2 = 1 and is equal to 2σ if µ2 = 2.
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low frequency in the HRS.11 The nominal value of a house is given 
by ph, where p is the price of a unit of housing. Upon sale of the 
house, a homeowner receives its selling price net of any remaining 
debt and net of a proportional transaction cost κ. In addition, a 
homeowner pays every period a proportional maintenance cost δ.
 Unlike owners, renters can move from one rental property 
to another at no moving cost. Therefore, a renter chooses the 
quantity of housing services consumed h at every period. All rental 
contracts are for one period, and the per-period rental rate, i.e. 
the proportion of the house value ph that is paid as rent, is given 
by:
 rh = r + δ, (2)
where r is the market interest rate. The rental rate reflects the com-
petitive cost to a landlord of holding a house and renting it out.
4.3 Income, saving and borrowing
The non-financial income of a household is given by ψsy, where y 
is the pension income, which changes across households but not 
over time, and ψs adjusts it according to the number of adults in 
the household. In addition, households can save at an interest 
rate r, and homeowners can borrow against the value of their 
house at a rate r + ξ, where ξ is the mortgage premium. The value 
of the house sets the borrowing limit, which is defined by:
 a ≥ −(1 − λi)hp, (3)
11 Table 2 shows that this is not the case in the DHS dataset since own-to-own 
moves are more popular than own-to-rent moves. However, note that here we 
are describing the NT model as presented in Nakajima and Telyukova (2011).
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where a denotes the stock of financial wealth and λi determines 
the share of housing wealth that can be borrowed against, 
which NT allow to vary with age (hence the subscript i) to capture 
age-specific variation in the costs of borrowing against housing 
wealth.
4.4 Health, mortality and medical expenditures
The health status of a household is denoted by m ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., M }, 
where m = 0 represents the death of the household. Different 
from De Nardi et al. (2010), in the NT model the health status does 
not affect the marginal utility of consumption. NT assume that 
m follows a firstorder Markov process in which πmi,m,m' denotes 
the transition probability from a health state m to a health state 
m', which is dependent on the present health state and the age 
of the household, i. In addition, at any period a household can 
transit from s = 2 to s = 1, which captures the death of a spouse. 
NT assume away divorces and remarriages due to their low 
frequency in HRS. Household size transition probabilities from s 
to s' are given by πsi,s,s'.
12 These transition probabilities imply that 
one spouse can die first via a stochastic shock to s, or both spouses 
can die at the same time via the household-wide mortality shock, 
the probability of which is given by πmi,m,0.
 The inclusion of the health status in the model allows defining 
the probability of incurring out-of-pocket medical expenditures 
(OPME). Realized OPME are denoted by x, and the probability that 
a given x is drawn is denoted by πxi,m,x, which is dependent on age 
and health status. The way medical expenditures are modelled 
may imply that, because of a large OPME shock, a household is 
forced to have negative consumption. Therefore, NT introduce a 
12 By assumption, πsi,1,1=1 and πsi,1,2=0 for all i.
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consumption floor guaranteed by the government and denoted 
by c. This government-provided insurance is means-tested, 
which implies that consumption by each household member is 
subsidized up to a level c only after the household sells all of its 
assets and chooses the minimum rental property available.
4.5 Household problem
Households choose consumption, saving, and housing such 
as to maximize present and future utility flows. The latter are 
discounted by the rate of time preference, β, and the probability 
of survival. Furthermore, for all future periods, households weigh 
the discounted utility of bequests with the probability of death. In 
addition, couples take into account the possibility of a transition 
to a one-person household by weighing both possible future 
scenarios (remaining a couple or becoming a single household) by 
its respective probability.
 For the case of a household that rents the house it occupies, 
utility is maximized subject to
the following restrictions:
 c˜ + a' + rhhp + x = (1 + r)a + ψsy, (4)
          {max{sc, c˜} if a' = 0 and h = h1 c =        c˜  otherwise, (5)
 p' = (1 + g)p, (6)
where a prime is used to denote a variable in the next period. 
Equation (4) is the periodic budget restriction; equation (5) 
introduces the consumption floor, where h1 is the smallest rental 
property available; and equation (6) provides the evolution of 
house prices, where g is the house price growth rate.
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 The maximization problem of a homeowner consists of a 
choice between staying in the current house or becoming a 
renter. The homeowner will choose at any point in time the 
option that provides the higher flow of current and future utility. 
A homeowner who chooses to sell the house and become a renter 
maximizes utility subject to (5), (6) and
 c˜ + a' + x + (κ + δ)hp = hp + (1 + r¯)a + ψsy, (7)
          {r if a' ≥ 0 r¯ =       r + ξ if a' ≤ 0. (8)
The budget constraint (7) does not include the rental cost since 
the household is still a homeowner in the current period, but 
it includes the proceeds from the sale of the house net of the 
maintenance cost δ and of the transaction cost κ. Equation (8) 
shows that the interest rate differs depending on whether a 
homeowner is a saver or a borrower. Upon sale of the house, 
a homeowner can still be left with a debt. However, once the 
homeowner becomes a renter the borrowing constraint (3) turns 
into a ≥ 0.
 Finally, a homeowner who does not move maximizes utility 
subject to (3), (6), (8) and
 c + a' + x + δhp = (1 + r¯)a + ψsy. (9) 
In this case there is no access to the consumption floor since the 
homeowner decides not to sell the house, which is a necessary 
condition to benefit from it.
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4.6 Estimation and Results
NT estimate the model in two steps. First, they calibrate the 
parameters that can be identified without explicitly using the 
model. These are defined in the vector Θ = (µ2, ψ2, δ, κ, r, ξ, g).
In addition, in the first step they compute the health status 
and household structure transition probabilities, as well 
as the probability of incurring medical expenditures, i.e. 




i,m,x). In the second step, they use the method 
of simulated moments to estimate the rest of the parameters in 
the model, i.e. Υ = (β, η, σ, ω1, γ, ζ , c, λi). The latter are estimated 
such as to provide the best match between the model and several 
moments in a sample of three HRS cohorts (those of age 65, 75, 
and 85 in 1996), which are followed over time between 1996 
and 2006. The targets are homeownership rate profiles, life cycle 
profiles of median total, financial and housing assets, proportion 
of households with debt, median debt of debtors, and median 
net worth profiles for homeowners and renters separately.
 Once the model is estimated, NT investigate the role of several 
model features on the saving behavior of retirees. They do so by 
shutting down each mechanism one at a time and comparing the 
outcome to the benchmark model. The mechanisms they consider 
are the following: bequest motive, medical expenses, extra utility 
from homeownership, collateral constraints, and the housing 
boom of 1996-2006. The results show that leading motivators 
for homeownership in retirement are the bequest motive and 
the utility benefits of homeownership. Upon shutting down 
the bequest motive, i.e. setting γ = 0, NT observe considerably 
faster declines in homeownership and net worth of homeowners 
compared to the benchmark. The net worth withdrawal rate 
of renters is also increased, but less than that of homeowners. 
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Similar results are found for homeowners when the utility benefits 
of homeownership are shut off, i.e. ω1 = ω0 = 1.13
 Another key feature of the results is that there appears to 
be potential demand for housing equity loans and reverse 
mortgages. Regardless of the importance of the bequest motive 
and of the utility benefit of homeownership, owner-occupiers 
react to a lower λi by increasing their debt somewhat through 
housing equity loans. However, due to tight borrowing conditions 
that apply in practice, many older households are unable to 
liquidate their housing. In addition to this result, by manipulating 
the value of g, NT find that the housing price boom in the US, 
although it increased housing equity borrowing somewhat, 
contributed substantially to the low net worth withdrawal rate 
among homeowners. Finally, NT find a rather modest effect of 
OPME. They do find that when setting x = 0, the youngest retirees 
shift towards a slightly faster decline in their net worth. However, 
the effect is almost negligible for older retirees.
 In summary, NT find that housing interacts with factors that 
solve the RSP, notably with the bequest motive. In addition, 
homeownership decreases the net worth withdrawal rate through 
the utility benefits it provides and the high costs of housing 
equity borrowing. On the other hand, OPME do not seem to 
play a major role in explaining homeownership late in life. 
These results differ substantially from those in De Nardi et al. 
(2010), who find an insignificant bequest motive and a larger 
role for OPME. There are several potential explanations for these 
differences. First, De Nardi et al. (2010) do not consider housing 
13 The utility benefits of homeownership capture factors such as attachment to 
one’s house and neighborhood and the ability to adapt the house to personal 
tastes. Furthermore, they capture financial benefits of ownership that are not 
explicit in the model, e.g. tax exemption of imputed rents, mortgage interest 
payment deduction, and insurance against rental rate fluctuation.
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as a separate portfolio element and thus they do not match 
the evolution of homeownership and housing wealth when 
estimating their parameters. In the work of NT, matching these 
facts clearly emphasizes the role of bequests and of the utility 
benefits of homeownership. Second, De Nardi et al. (2010) employ 
data on singles who, arguably, are less prone to have a bequest 
motive than couples. Couples are more likely to have children 
and also more likely to be wealthier, both of which are facts that 
potentially lead to a stronger bequest motive. Third, De Nardi et 
al. (2010) consider that the worsening of the health status has 
a negative effect on the marginal utility of consumption, while 
NT do not. Was this feature included in the NT model, it could 
easily compete with the bequest motive in explaining the HRS 
wealth profiles. However, it is not entirely clear what the outcome 
would be.
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5. Homeownership and the bequest motive
The correlation between homeownership and the bequest motive 
pointed out by NT serves as a link between the two streams of lit-
erature discussed in Sections 2 and 3, and has potentially relevant 
implications for the understanding of the retirement-savings 
puzzle (RSP). Table 4 shows how in a sample of DHS households 
running from 2005 to 2014, homeownership is clearly  associated 
with the bequest motive. Households are asked about the 
importance to save for leaving a house and/or other assets to their 
children and, as well, about the importance of saving to leave a 
bequest in the form of money. In both cases they are asked to rank 
the importance from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important). 
Additionally, households are asked what is the chance that they 
leave a bequest. In all cases, homeowners seem more inclined 
than renters to leave a bequest, which, as Table 4 shows, holds 
when considering both the mean and median of the responses’ 
distribution. The relationship between homeownership and 
bequests becomes even more clear when only older households 
are considered.
 The results of the work by NT, as well as the evidence for the 
Netherlands shown in Table 4, indicate that there is a correlation 
between homeownership and the bequest motive. However, by 
relying strictly on this evidence one cannot exactly say in which 
direction the causality runs: either from the bequest motive to 
homeownership or vice versa. It can be that households with a 
strong bequest motive decide to become homeowners so that they 
can bequeath a house. Conversely, it can be that, once having 
become homeowners, households rationalize the house as an 
asset to be bequeathed. Furthermore, it can be that there is a 
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third variable, for instance lifetime income, that would explain 
both homeownership and bequests simultaneously.
 To briefly check for the role of lifetime income as a confounding 
factor, Table 5 provides, next to the bivariate correlation between 
homeownership and the different measures of the bequest 
motive, the corresponding partial correlations keeping fixed the 
average over time of household income. The latter is used here 
as a proxy for lifetime income. The latter are the correlations that 
would be observed if average income did not vary. Additionally, 
the last column provides the p-values associated with the partial 
Table 4. Importance of the bequest motive by housing tenure 
(2005-2014)
Homeowners N. of Renters N. of
Mean Median obs. Mean Median obs.
Importance of 
saving for a 
bequest (1)
Full sample 3.09 3 8,597 2.43 2 3,335
Older adults 3.35 3 3,698 2.41 2 1,418
Importance of 
saving for a 
bequest (2)
Full sample 3.11 3 8,889 2.62 2 3,545




Full sample 82.76 100 9,446 49.83 50 3,968
Older adults 84.53 100 4,021 40.83 25 1,670
Source: DHS. Older households are defined as households with a household head 
who is 60 or older. The importance of saving for a bequest is measured on a scale 
from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important). In (1), households rank the 
importance of saving “to leave a house and/or other valuable assets to your 
children”, while in (2) they rank the importance of saving “to leave money to your 
children (or other relatives)”. Chance of leaving a bequest is measured on a scale 
from 0 (no chance) to 100 (100% chance).
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correlations.14 A comparison of the first and second columns 
illustrates that keeping average income constant slightly decreases 
the correlation between homeownership and bequests. However, 
the correlation coefficients remain positive and, as the last column 
in the table shows, all partial correlations are highly significant. 
These results suggest that income is not the explanation, or at 
least not the only explanation, for the correlations observed in 
Table 4. This holds both when using the entire sample and when 
only focusing on older adults. Note that for the latter, average 
household income is more likely to be a good proxy for lifetime 
income, since, compared to labor income, pension income is 
considered to be a better proxy for lifetime income.15
 The results of the work by NT, as well as the evidence for the 
Netherlands shown in Tables 4 and 5, suggest that an important 
reason why housing is held throughout retirement is because 
it is viewed as an asset to be bequeathed. Even though we 
cannot make any firm statement about the direction of causality 
at this stage, it is clear in any case that homeownership is an 
element to consider when studying bequests. This insight has 
14 Partial correlations are obtained by fitting regressions of each of the measures 
of the bequest motive on homeownership and household income. The 
 coefficient is then computed as , where t is the t-statistic, n is the 
 number of observations, and k is the number of explanatory variables in the 
regression. The p-values are given by 2P r(tn−k > |t|), where tn−k follows a 
student’s t distribution with n−k degrees of freedom. Partial correlation does 
not make an assumption about the direction of causality. Therefore, the 
outcome would be the same if, in the regressions, homeownership was used 
as dependent variable and the bequest motive as explanatory variable. For 
more information on partial correlation, see Greene (2012).
15 As explained in Knoef et al. (2013), in the Netherlands pension income reflects, 
to some extent, the level of income earned throughout the working life of an 
individual. Furthermore, they assert that pension income represents a major 
share of the income of retirees, that the variance of income shocks is smaller 
for retirees than for working people, and that income shocks are more 
persistent for retirees. For all these reasons, Knoef et al. (2013) argue that 
pension income especially is a good proxy for lifetime income.
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relevant implications for understanding the RSP, especially in 
the Netherlands, where due to public coverage of long-term 
expenses, precautionary saving is unlikely to play a role. 
Davidoff (2010) suggests that in the US, older homeowners do not 
liquidate housing equity because they use it as long-term care 
insurance. However, in the Netherlands there is public coverage 
of long-term care expenses. Nevertheless, as shown by De Graaf 
and Rouwendal (2012) and Van Ooijen et al. (2015) among others, 
older homeowners still do not decumulate their housing equity, 
which opens the door to consider bequests as an important factor. 
This idea is supported by the evidence provided by Dillingh et al. 
(2015), who find that, among homeowners, both having children 
and the willingness to leave a bequest have a strong negative 
impact on interest in reverse mortgages.






for a bequest (1)
Full sample 0.180 0.140 0.000
Older adults 0.251 0.208 0.000
Importance of saving
for a bequest (2)
Full sample 0.135 0.090 0.000
Older adults 0.195 0.150 0.000
Chance of leaving
a bequest
Full sample 0.424 0.351 0.000
Older adults 0.532 0.458 0.000
Source: DHS. Older households are defined as households with a household head 
who is 60 or older. The importance of saving for a bequest is measured on a scale 
from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important). In (1), households rank the 
importance of saving “to leave a house and/or other valuable assets to your chil-
dren”, while in (2) they rank the importance of saving “to leave money to your 
children (or other relatives)”. Chance of leaving a bequest is measured on a scale 
from 0 (no chance) to 100 (100% chance). The first column shows the bivariate 
correlation between the different measures of the bequest motive and homeown-
ership. The second column shows partial correlations which keep the influence of 
average household income on homeownership and bequests constant. The third 
column shows the significance of the partial correlations.
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6. Alternative bequest motives
There are several possible reasons why households would prefer 
to leave a bequest in the form of a house rather than doing it in 
the form of cash. NT suggest that, because there are extra utility 
benefits of homeownership, households who want to accumulate 
assets in retirement due to a bequest motive prefer to do so in the 
form of a house. Furthermore, they point to the fact that due to 
the transaction costs associated with liquidating housing equity, 
it is convenient for older homeowners to stick to their housing 
when saving for a bequest rather than opting for more liquid 
alternatives. There are, however, alternative ways of modelling 
bequests that provide insights on why saving for a bequest in 
the form of a house yields extra benefits compared to other 
alternatives. In this section, we review these alternative bequest 
motives in order to better grasp this issue.
6.1 Altruistic bequests
Following previous work such as that by Hurd (1989) and Kopczuk 
and Lupton (2007), NT model the bequest motive as an egoistic 
motive, implying that bequests are generated strictly by the desire 
of individuals to have positive net worth upon death, i.e. their 
aim to be the richest in the cemetery. The egoistic motive is thus 
independent of the economic situation of the heirs, and it can 
apply even when a household has no heirs.
 As an alternative to the egoistic motive, Laitner (2002) 
proposes a model in which the bequest function depends on the 
consumption possibilities of the heirs. This idea originated from 
earlier work by Barro (1974) and Becker (1974), and, in its simplest 
form, it consists of rewriting the within period utility in the NT 
model as follows:
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 V P = u(c, h, o; s) + αV K (b), (10)
where V P (·) is the utility function of the parents and V K (·) the 
utility function of the heirs. The first element in (10) is identical to 
that in Equation (1), whereas the second element substitutes the 
bequest motive in the NT model by αV K (b), where α indicates 
to what extent a household cares about its heirs. The size of the 
bequest influences the lifetime income of the recipient and thus 
has a positive effect on the recipient’s utility, i.e. ∂V K (b)/∂b > 0. 
However, the higher the lifetime income of the recipient, the 
lower the marginal utility of additional bequeathed wealth. 
Therefore, if the heirs already have a high lifetime income without 
considering the bequest, the amount bequeathed is likely to be 
comparatively small.
 Employing a survey of US pension holders, Laitner and Juster 
(1996) find that willingness to leave a bequest is higher for 
households with the lowest assessment of their children’s likely 
earnings. In addition, Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) find evidence of 
parental altruism in Sweden and the US. However, this evidence 
contradicts with the work by Altonji et al. (1997) and Poterba 
(2001), who find that, in the US, parents do not modify inter vivos 
transfers in response to changes in their children’s permanent 
income. In addition, Kopczuk and Lupton (2007), who employ 
panel data on singles from the AHEAD survey, make a case against 
the altruistic model by showing that there are households who 
save for a bequest without having children, leading them to 
argue that children and bequests are independent of each other. 
However, we must note that altruism is not necessarily only 
towards children. There can be as well altruism towards other 
relatives and/or towards non-relatives.
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 Table 6 shows that, according to DHS data, Dutch older 
households with children assign higher importance to saving 
for a bequest. This difference is clearest when only homeowners 
are considered. Considering only altruism towards children, i.e. 
leaving out altruism towards other (non)relatives, this descriptive 
Table 6. Correlation between having children and the bequest 
motive (2005-2014)
Children N. of No children  N. of
Homeowners Mean Median obs. Mean Median obs.
Importance of 
saving for a 
bequest (1)
Full sample 3.38 3 6,747 1.83 1 1,485
Older adults 3.50 4 3,329 1.67 1 297
Importance of 
saving for a 
bequest (2)
Full sample 3.41 3 6,812 1.95 1 1,711




Full sample 82.35 100 7,136 81.62 99 2,310
Older adults 83.98 100 3,501 81.88 100 520
Children N. of No children N. of
Renters Mean Median obs. Mean Median obs.
Importance of 
saving for a 
bequest (1)
Full sample 2.69 2 2,035 1.90 1 1,097
Older adults 2.51 2 1,195 1.65 1 176
Importance of 
saving for a 
bequest (2)
Full sample 2.96 2 2,127 2.03 1 1,215




Full sample 42.35 25 2,312 62.44 80 1,656
Older adults 39.70 20 1,369 52.05 50 301
Source: DHS. Older households are defined as households with a household head 
who is 60 or older. The importance of saving for a bequest is measured on a scale 
from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important). In (1), households rank the 
importance of saving “to leave a house and/or other valuable assets to your 
children”, while in (2) they rank the importance of saving “to leave money to your 
children (or other relatives)”. Chance of leaving a bequest is measured on a scale 
from 0 (no chance) to 100 (100% chance).
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result suggests that the altruistic model is likely to apply in the 
Dutch case. However, regarding the chance of leaving a bequest, 
having children does not seem to play such an important role. In 
fact, among renters, those with children report a higher chance of 
leaving a bequest compared to those without children.
 Among homeowners, there does not seem to be a difference 
between households with children and households without. 
Nevertheless, note that the importance of saving for a bequest 
is not the same as the chance of actually leaving a bequest. 
Comparing homeowners and renters, Table 6 confirms the strong 
correlation between homeownership and the bequest motive 
already observed in Tables 4 and 5.
 Even though in general the evidence appears to be mixed, the 
altruistic model should not be dismissed since it has important 
implications for understanding the rationale behind the bequest 
motive, as well as for understanding how wealth inequality is 
transferred from one generation to the next. In addition, as will 
become clear below, the altruistic model can help explain the 
interaction between homeownership and the bequest motive that 
stems from the NT model.
6.2 Strategic bequests
A different approach to the bequest motive was introduced by the 
early work of Bernheim et al. (1985), who suggest that bequests 
are generated in a context of intergenerational exchange. In 
this context, parents are still altruistic in that they care about 
the utility of their heirs. However, at the same time, they also 
care about the services provided to them by their children. 
Consequently, they try to strategically influence their children’s 
actions in their favor by using the bequest as an incentive. In 
the strategic model, it makes sense to separate housing from the 
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other elements of the household portfolio, since it is an asset 
that parents can easily use to signal a reward for their children’s 
services. In that way, the strategic model can help to better 
understand the interaction between homeownership and the 
retirement–savings puzzle (RSP).
 In a very stylized way, strategic bequests can be introduced 
in the NT model by modifying the within-period-utility of the 
altruistic version of the model, given by Equation (10), as follows:
 V P = u(c, h, o, τ ; s) + αV K (b, τ ),  (11)
where τ denotes the services provided by the children to their 
parents, which increase parental utility, i.e. ∂u(·)/∂τ > 0 but 
affect the utility of the children negatively, i.e. ∂V K (b, τ )/∂τ < 0. 
In Bernheim et al.’s model, the household commits itself to a 
bequest rule. The latter specifies the fraction of the bequest given 
to each recipient for each amount of services provided, and it 
establishes that a descendant will be disinherited in favor of 
other recipients if he or she does not contribute with a minimum 
amount of services. For the rule to be convincing, parents must 
be credibly committed to retain enough wealth for bequest 
purposes. This can be done by holding wealth in illiquid form 
such as housing equity. If transactions costs are high and financial 
products to liquidate housing are hardly available, holding onto a 
house can be a way for older adults to signal a future bequest to 
the heirs.
 The empirical literature on the strategic model generally follows 
an approach that consists of regressing the number of visits by 
the heirs to the parents on parental wealth. The main challenge 
is to take into account the endogeneity of parental wealth, since, 
if strategic behavior applies, parents will increase their wealth 
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holdings in response to increased attention. Furthermore, there 
may be unobserved factors that affect both parental wealth 
and the number of contacts. The literature generally tackles 
this issue by instrumenting for wealth. Bernheim et al. (1985) 
instrument wealth with lifetime earnings and, based on US 
data, find evidence that supports the altruistic model. Perozek 
(1998) instruments with an index that maps occupations into a 
socio-economic ranking and controls for additional individual 
and family characteristics. Using a different US dataset, he claims 
that the results by Bernheim et al. are not entirely robust. On the 
other hand, Angelini (2007) uses the educational level and the 
number of rooms in the parental house as instruments. Using data 
on several European countries she finds empirical support for the 
strategic model. The effect appears to be strongest when using 
illiquid forms of wealth, such as housing, as explanatory variable. 
This finding suggests that housing is used as a strategic bequest, 
and it helps understand the interaction between homeownership 
and bequests observed by NT.
 Table 7 shows that, according to DHS data, the strategic motive 
is not very popular among Dutch households. Homeowners who 
are above 65 years of age appear to be the most inclined to use 
bequests strategically. However, only 3.84% of them report a 
strategic bequest motive.16 There are three caveats to keep in 
mind when using these data. First, the majority of house- holds, 
especially homeowners, report not having any preconceived 
bequest plans; second, households may be inclined towards 
16 Note that the higher share of old homeowners reporting a strategic bequest 
motive compared to the full sample may simply reflect the fact that older 
households are more likely to have plans about the use of their net worth. In 
any case, when observing both the full sample and older households, the 
share of respondents who report a strategic bequest motive is always rather 
low.
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reporting altruistic bequests to hide their self-indulgence; and, 
third, those willing to leave a bequest regardless of the services 
provided might be willing to increase it if services are actually 
provided. These are all arguments suggesting that strategic 
bequests may be more important than as reflected in Table 7. In 
any case, Table 7 shows that both strategic and altruistic bequest 
motives are present, and that they are more popular among 
homeowners than among renters.
Table 7. Presence of strategic and altruistic bequest motives 
(2005-2014)
Full sample Older households
Homeowners Renters Homeowners Renters
(1) Strategic bequest 3.46% 1.29% 3.84% 1.75%
(2) Altruistic bequest 22.32% 8.97% 31.01% 8.87%
(3) No explicit plans about 
bequests
66.03% 53.68% 57.33% 50.52%
(4) No bequest 1.56% 6.62% 1.47% 8.18%
(5) None of the above 6.63% 29.44% 6.35% 30.67%
Number of observations 7135 2311 2529 1045
Source: DHS. Conditional on having children, respondents are asked which 
statement best reflects their opinion: (1) leaving a bequest if children provide 
services; (2) leaving a bequest regardless of services provided; (3) no explicit plans 
about leaving a bequest; (4) no intention to leave a bequest; (5) none of the 
above. Older households are defined as households with a household head who 
is 60 or older.
54 survey paper 44
7. Housing as a commitment device
An additional complement to the NT model that might shed light 
on how housing equity during retirement can help solve the 
retirement-savings puzzle (RSP) is provided by the literature on 
temptation and self-control. In two seminal contributions to this 
literature, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) develop a model in 
which an agent chooses between different sets of alternatives 
for consumption, some of which contain a tempting good. The 
latter is a good that the agent may crave; however, consuming 
it represents a sub-optimal choice. If the agent chooses the 
set of alternatives that contains the tempting good, he or she 
will either consume it or exert self-control to not do so, which 
comes at a utility cost. A different option consists of choosing a 
set of alternatives that excludes the temptation good and thus 
commits the agent to not choosing it. This option saves the cost of 
self-control.
 The model by Gul and Pesendorfer has been applied tovarious 
fields within economics. There is a recently emerging literature 
(e.g. Angelini et al., 2013; Kovacs, 2014; and Ghent, 2015) that 
applies it to the study of housing demand over the life cycle. This 
literature points out the role of housing as a commitment device. 
The idea is that if immediate consumption is a temptation good, 
households will suboptimally choose to consume too much in the 
present and will not save enough for retirement. In this context, 
households can commit themselves to save by investing their 
wealth in housing. This feature can be incorporated in the NT 
model of Section 4.1.1 by rewriting the utility function as follows:
 V = u(c, h, o; s) − ρ(v(c*, h, 0; s) − u(c, h, o; s)),   (12)
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where for simplicity we have excluded the bequest motive. The 
second element in (12) is the temptation term, which is weighted 
by ρ, and where v(·) is the level of utility attained when all 
wealth is liquidated, the household is a renter (o = 0), and 
consumption is set to its maximum immediate level, c*. If the 
household chooses this utility level, the temptation term cancels 
out. Otherwise, the temptation term is assumed to be positive, 
i.e. u(·) < v(·) if c < c*, and it can be seen as the utility cost of 
self-control, since it provides the utility difference between the 
tempting alternative and the actual choice.
 To increase lifetime utility, a household should save for the 
future but at the same time reduce the cost of self-control. This 
is possible by investing in illiquid assets, which will reduce the 
wealth disposable for immediate consumption and, in turn, 
reduce the cost of self-control. Housing can play this role, since 
its liquidation usually implies high transaction costs and financial 
instruments to liquidate housing equity are not always readily 
available. The temptation motive has the potential of explaining 
the interaction between homeownership and altruistic or strategic 
bequests. If, in the presence of immediate consumption as a 
tempting alternative, one wants to make sure that a bequest is 
left for the following generation, using housing as a commitment 
device can come in handy, especially if one wants to strategically 
signal that a bequest will come.
 To test the temptation motive for housing, Angelini et al. 
(2013) use European life history data and regress the hazard rate 
of homeownership, i.e. the probability that a renter will transit 
to homeownership, on the value of liquid and illiquid financial 
assets in the household portfolio. They find a considerable effect 
of holding illiquid financial assets, especially strong for individu-
als above forty years of age. As the authors argue, the latter are 
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the most likely to transit into homeownership for commitment 
purposes, since earlier in life the purchase of a house is more 
likely related to family formation. On the other hand, Kovacs 
(2014) follows a different approach, consisting of estimating a 
structural life cycle model with temptation preferences. Her model 
predicts that the interaction between housing services in the util-
ity function and temptation preferences induces a high demand 
for housing as a commitment device. Housing demand appears to 
be about 30% higher at its peak over the life cycle when housing 
plays a commitment role compared to when it does not.
 Table 8 shows that about 40% of the rent-to-own transitions 
registered in the DHS dataset correspond to households with a 
household head who is forty years of age or more. Even though 
these moves might be linked to events such as marriage, divorce 
or increase in family size, Angelini et. al. (2013) point out that 
rent-to-own transitions that take place above forty are more likely 
to be for commitment purposes than those that take place below 
that age. In addition, the lower panel of Table 8 shows that, 
when considering the whole DHS sample between 2005 and 2014, 
remaining mortgage debt is still relatively high for households 
who are above 60. This suggests that a reasonable percentage of 
households are likely to have become homeowners (or to have 
increased the size of their property) late in life.
 Summarizing, Table 8 indicates that commitment demand for 
housing is a relevant possibility in the Netherlands. However, 
a note of caution is in place here since the evidence is very 
descriptive and a more in-depth study is needed to elucidate the 
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true relevance of the use of housing as a commitment device.17 
For example, the fact that even older homeowners still hold 
mortgage debt may be due to the tax deductibility of mortgage 
interest and/or the popularity of interest-only mortgages. 
Therefore, any future study on this topic should take these 
factors into account as well. Nevertheless, the evidence reported 
here does not rule out the fact that, in combination with the 
descriptive evidence on the relationship between homeownership 
and bequests, the commitment demand for housing potentially 
adds to the understanding of the RSP in the Netherlands.
 
17 To bring the analysis a step further, we have checked whether answers to the 
DHS question ”Do you find it easy or difficult to control your expenditures?” 
correlate with housing tenure. We find that the correlation coefficient is very 
close to zero. However, a more in-depth analysis is required to clarify whether 
housing is used as a commitment device.
Table 8. Rent-to-own moves and remaining mortgage debt (RMD) 
(2005-2014)
Below 40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70+ Total
Rent-to-own Number 115 51 15 5 4 190
moves % 60.53% 26.84% 7.89% 2.63% 2.11% 100%
RMD % with RMD 19.34% 25.90% 29.71% 29.18% 23.03% 25.26%
Average 37.63 41.44 38.67 33.26 21.16 34.99
Source: DHS. Average RMD is provided in thousands. The last column of the RMD 
panel provides the percentage of households with RMD and the average RMD 
when all ages are pooled together. Renters are included when calculating statistics 
regarding RMD.
58 survey paper 44
8. Conclusion
A full understanding of the underlying causes behind the 
retirement-savings puzzle (RSP) is crucial for an assessment of the 
adequacy of retirement savings in the context of pension system 
reforms. To that end, we complement the RSP literature by review-
ing the literature on housing equity during retirement (HER). The 
HER literature indicates that retirees are generally reluctant to 
withdraw their housing equity, which has clear implications for 
the understanding of the RSP. This insight is picked up by Naka-
jima and Telyukova (2011), who develop a model of the retirement 
savings of couples with housing. One of their main conclusions is 
that housing as a bequeathable asset plays a major role in solving 
the RSP. Further literature on altruistic and strategic bequests, as 
well as on housing as a commitment device, provide additional 
insights to understand the connection between bequests, home-
ownership, and the RSP.
 The descriptive evidence that we draw from the Dutch National 
Bank Household Survey (DHS) shows that a vast majority of 
Dutch homeowners do not sell their house to finance their 
retirement, and that it is likely that homeownership among 
retirees will increase in the near future due to cohort effects. 
More interestingly, the evidence shows that there is a strong 
correlation between homeownership and the importance given 
to leave a bequest, as well as between homeownership and the 
self-perceived chance that a bequest will be left. Even though the 
evidence that we have provided here does not allow us to take a 
stand on the direction in which the causality runs, i.e. either from 
the bequest motive to homeownership or vice versa, it is clear that 
any future study on bequests must take the relevance of housing 
into account. Leaving housing out of the picture may seriously 
the role of housing as a bequeathable asset 59
underestimate the bequest motive for those households that view 
their housing equity as the main element to be bequeathed.
 The RSP literature is still a fertile ground for new contributions. 
Structural models in the line of De Nardi et al. (2010) and Nakajima 
and Telyukova (2011), as well as reduced form type of analysis, 
can bring on a better understanding of the connection between 
homeownership, bequests, and the RSP. In addition, the literature 
on strategic bequests as well as the literature on temptation and 
commitment provide potentially fruitful lines of research for the 
further understanding of the stylized facts laid out in this survey 
paper.
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The role of housing as a bequeathable asset
The so-called retirement-savings puzzle is a phenomenon by which, 
contrary to what the basic life-cycle model predicts, households do not 
run down their wealth significantly during retirement. In this survey 
paper Eduard Suari-Andreu, Rob Alessie and Viola Angelini (all RUG) 
briefly review the literature that attempts to solve the retirement savings 
puzzle. In addition, they  review more extensively the literature on 
housing equity during retirement. This paper contains important policy 
recommendations on this subject.
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